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Abstract. We study network connection games where the nodes of a network perform edge swaps
in order to improve their communication costs. For the model proposed by [2], in which the selfish
cost of a node is the sum of all shortest path distances to the other nodes, we use the probabilistic
method to provide a new, structural characterization of equilibrium graphs. We show how to use this
characterization in order to prove upper bounds on the diameter of equilibrium graphs in terms of the
size of the largest k-vicinity (defined as the the set of vertices within distance k from a vertex), for
any k ≥ 1 and in terms of the number of edges, thus settling positively a conjecture of [2] in the cases
of graphs of large k-vicinity size (including graphs of large maximum degree) and of graphs which are
dense enough.
Next, we present a new swap-based network creation game, in which selfish costs depend on the imme-
diate neighborhood of each node; in particular, the profit of a node is defined as the sum of the degrees
of its neighbors. We prove that, in contrast to the previous model, this network creation game admits
an exact potential, and also that any equilibrium graph contains an induced star. The existence of the
potential function is exploited in order to show that an equilibrium can be reached in expected polyno-
mial time even in the case where nodes can only acquire limited knowledge concerning non-neighboring
nodes.
Keywords: network creation game, diameter, swap equilibrium, potential game, probabilistic method
1 Introduction
Large scale networks, such as the Internet, are built, maintained and used by selfish entities, all of whom
aim at optimizing their own cost and quality of network usage. This suggests that such individual entities
will have an incentive to form connections with others to shape the network in ways that are advantageous
to themselves. A network creation game specifies a set of players, the link formation actions available to each
player and the payoffs to each player from the networks that arise out of the link formation action profiles
adopted by the players. There are many potential models of network creation games that can be developed,
depending on which individuals have the decision power to form or delete a link (i.e., which subset of nodes
forms the set of players, and what are their available strategies), as well as on the specification of the payoff
allocation rule (i.e., what is the cost of forming or deleting a link and under which objectives do the selfish
individuals evaluate the quality of a network).
The study of network creation games focuses on strategically stable or equilibrium networks, i.e., networks
where there are no incentives for individual players to form or delete links and thereby alter the network. We
are interested in both static and dynamic properties of equilibrium networks. Static properties include the
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structure (i.e., the topologies) of equilibrium networks, as well as bounds on the Price of Anarchy [8] and
the Price of Stability [3] in network creation games, which, roughly speaking, measure the effect of selfish
link formation on the quality of the resulting network. On the other hand, dynamic properties of equilibrium
networks specify whether (and how fast) selfish players can actually converge into a stable network and thus
find a desired equilibrium.
Fabrikant et al. [6] introduced a simple network formation game, where each player is identified with a
node, and each node can choose to create a link between itself and any subset of other nodes. Each link
requires a fixed cost α > 0 to be built, and each player has two competing goals: to pay for as few links
as possible, and to minimize the distance to all other players in the resulting network. In particular, the
objective of each player is to minimize the sum of costs of the links created by itself plus the sum of distances
to all other nodes of the resulting network. In such a setting, the network is in equilibrium if no node can
improve her objective cost by deleting and/or creating any subset of incident links. Fabrikant et al. [6] proved
an upper bound of O(α) on the Price of Anarchy. Subsequent work [1,4,11] showed that the Price of Anarchy
is constant for almost all values of α.
This model of a network creation game is simple enough, while it achieves to capture the flexibility of
nodes to create and delete links as well as the trade-off between the cost of creating links and the cost of
reaching the other nodes of the network. However, it has a main drawback: it is NP-hard to compute a best
response of a node. That is, a (computationally bounded) node can not decide which links to add and which
to remove in order to achieve a minimal cost, given the strategies of the other nodes. This implies that the
players of the game can not even decide whether they are in equilibrium or not, which further implies that
the nodes are incapable of converging into an equilibrium network by performing local selfish improvements.
In view of the above drawback, Alon et al. [2] proposed a simpler model, namely the basic network creation
game. In this game the nodes are significantly less flexible in creating and deleting links: in particular, a node
can only swap an existing link with another, i.e., delete an incident link and create a new incident link. Alon
et al. [2] considered two different objectives for the nodes, yielding two versions of a basic network creation
game: In the sum version, the cost of a node is the sum of its distances to all other nodes, while in the max
version the cost of a node is the greatest distance between itself and any other node (i.e., the eccentricity of
the node, using graph-theoretic terminology). A network is in swap equilibrium if no node can decrease its
cost by deleting an incident link and creating a new one. With this restriction on the available strategies of
each node, it is easy to see that swap equilibria (under either cost objective) can be detected in polynomial
time: each node simply has to check each possible swap of a non-neighboring node with a neighboring one.
Alon et al. [2] focused on the structure of equilibrium networks of basic network creation games and,
in particular, on bounding the diameter of equilibrium networks. For the sum version they gave an upper
bound of 2O(
√
lnn) (n being the number of nodes), a lower bound of 3, and a tight bound of 2 for trees. For
the diameter version they gave a lower bound of Ω(
√
n) and a tight upper bound of 3 for trees. Recently,
Lenzner [9] studied the best response dynamics of the sum version of basic network creation games. He
proved that, when played on a tree, the game admits an ordinal potential function [12], implying that any
selfish improvement sequence is guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium tree. In addition, it was shown that
a cubic upper bound of selfish steps is needed in order to reach an equilibrium tree. For general networks
however (i.e., networks with cycles), it was shown that the game allows best-response cycles, implying that
the game does no longer admit any kind of potential function, which further implies that selfish improvements
do not necessarily converge to an equilibrium network.
In a recent paper [10] the authors study the concept of asymmetric swap equilibrium and show how this
concept generalizes and unifies some other equilibrium concepts for network creation games (as the network
creation game of [6] and the bounded-budget network creation game of [5]). Their main result has some
similarities to part A in our Lemma 1, but we chose to present our proof here for completeness and because
it is different and shorter. The authors in [10] use their results to settle the conjecture of [2] in the case
where the minimum degree of an induced subgraph of the equilibrium graph is at least nǫ, for some ǫ > 0.
In contrast, our results do not require any assumptions on the minimum degree and equilibrium graphs may
even have vertices of degree 1.
2
1.1 Our Contribution
This paper has two main contributions which are briefly described here. First, for the sum version of the
model of [2], we provide in Theorem 1 a new, structural characterization of equilibrium graphs, which roughly
states that for any two vertices of degree greater than 1, the majority of the rest of the vertices are almost
equidistant from them. The proof uses the probabilistic method, combined with some basic properties of
equilibrium graphs. Our characterization can also be seen as a stronger “skewness” property like the one
defined by the authors in [2] (see Section 5 in that paper). In fact, using Theorem 1, we show how we can
prove upper bounds on the diameter of equilibrium graphs in terms of the size of the largest k-vicinity, for
any k ≥ 1 and in terms of the number of edges. As shown in Corollary 2 and in Theorem 3, this partially
settles positively a conjecture of [2] (that equilibria graphs have poly-logarithmic diameter), in the cases (a)
of graphs that have a vertex with large k-vicinity (including graphs with sufficiently large maximum degree)
and (b) of graphs which are dense enough.
Even though the model of [2] is more basic than the model of [6] (in that better responses can be
determined in polynomial time), it still relies on the fact that each vertex/player has global knowledge of the
graph, which is needed to compute its cost function. Furthermore, it is so far unknown how an equilibrium
can be reached in a distributed, uncoordinated manner, starting from any initial graph configuration. In
many cases though, especially for large-scale networks like the Internet, there is no coordination between
nodes and only local information is at their immediate disposal. To address these issues, we present, as our
second contribution in this paper, a new swap-based network creation game, in which selfish costs depend
on the immediate neighborhood of each vertex/player. In particular, for each vertex, we define its profit to
be the sum of the degrees of its neighbors, which is also related to the number of paths of length 2 from that
vertex. We prove that, unlike the model of [2], this network creation game admits an exact potential, and
also that any equilibrium graph contains an induced star. The existence of a potential function implies that
better response dynamics always converge to an equilibrium graph within a polynomial number of steps in
the number of vertices. Furthermore, we consider a case where vertices can only acquire limited knowledge
concerning non-neighboring vertices and we show that we can reach equilibrium in expected polynomial
time.
1.2 Organization of the Paper
The model of Alon et al. [2] together with some first useful results are presented in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2
we present the proof of our main theorem, characterizing graphs in Sum-Swap Equilibrium (SSE). Further-
more, we provide some consequences of our characterization in the cases of dense and large degree graphs in
Section 2.3. Section 3 is devoted to the definition of our new model of network formation with local costs.
The proof that our network formation game admits a potential is given in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 we
consider the case where vertices can have limited knowledge of the graph. Finally, in Section 4, we provide
some concluding remarks and open questions.
1.3 Notation
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph. For a vertex v ∈ V , we denote by NG(v) the set of neighbors of
v in G. We will denote by ∆G the maximum degree of a vertex of G, i.e., ∆G = maxv∈V deg(v), where
deg(v) = |NG(v)|. For a vertex v of a graph G, we will denote by deg−1(v) the number of neighbors of v
that have degree at least 2. We will also denote by N−1(v) the set of neighbors of v having degree at least
2, i.e. deg−1(v) = |N−1(v)|.
For any two vertices v, u ∈ V we will denote by distG(u, v) = distG(v, u) the length of a shortest path be-
tween u and v in G. We denote by diam(G) the diameter of G, defined as diam(G) = maxu∈V,v∈V distG(u, v).
For any vertex v ∈ V we will denote by WG(v) the sum of distances of all vertices from v in G, i.e.,
WG(v) =
∑
u∈V distG(u, v). If the graph is disconnected, then we define WG(v) to be infinite.
For any subset of vertices S ⊆ V , we denote by G[S] the subgraph of G induced on the set S. Finally,
following the notation in [2], for any vertex u ∈ V and any k, we will denote by Bu(k) the k-vicinity of u,
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i.e. Bu(k)
def
= {w : dist(w, u) ≤ k}. We will sometimes omit the subscripts G in the above notation if the
graph is understood from the context.
2 Diameter in the Sum Version of Swap Equilibria
In this section we consider the sum version of the model of Alon et. al [2]. In particular, in Theorem 1
we provide a structural characterization of graphs G that are in Sum-Swap Equilibrium (SSE). Using this
characterization we provide an upper bound on the diameter of any swap equilibrium graph which depends
on the size of its largest k-vicinity, for any k > 0.
2.1 The Model and some First Results
We will first describe more formally the model of a basic network creation game proposed in [2], and which
we consider in this section. We are given an undirected graph G = (V,E), where each vertex corresponds
to a player. The connection cost of player v ∈ V is the sum of distances between v and all other vertices,
i.e., equals WG(v). A player can perform “edge swaps”, i.e., replace an incident existing edge with another
incident edge. More formally, let u ∈ NG(v) and w /∈ NG(v). Then, the edge swap (u,w) of v removes the
edge {v, u} and creates the edge {v, w}. Therefore, the set of pure strategies of player v ∈ V in graph G is
SG(v) = {NG(v) × {V \ {NG(v) ∪ {v}}}}. Observe that the set of pure strategies of a player depends on the
current graph G and that an edge swap performed by a player modifies the graph.
We say that a graph is in swap sum-equilibrium (SSE in short) if no player (vertex) can improve her
connection cost by performing an edge swap. More formally, we denote by Gsv the graph obtained from G
when player v performs the edge swap sv ∈ SG(v). Then, we say that the graph G = (V,E) is in SSE if for
all v ∈ V , WG(v) ≤WGsv (v) for all sv ∈ SG(v).
We now prove some basic structural properties of graphs in SSE. To avoid trivialities, all graphs considered
here will be connected.
Lemma 1. Let G be a graph in swap sum-equilibrium and let n be the number of vertices. Then the following
hold:
A. Let u, v be any two vertices of degree greater than 1. Then, there are at least two paths from u to v such
that the first edge on each path is different.
B. If G has a vertex of degree 2, then diam(G) ≤ 9.
Proof. Part (A.): For some integer k ≥ 1, let P be the u−v path u = v0, v1, . . . , vk = v. Assume for the sake
of contradiction that all u− v paths use the edge {u, v1} (i.e., {u, v1} is a bridge in G) and let S denote the
set of vertices reachable from u without passing through v1. Since deg(v) ≥ 2, there is at least one vertex
w 6= vk−1 directly connected to it. Notice also that, since G is by assumption in SSE, for any vertex u′ ∈ S,
we have that WG[S](u) ≤ WG[S](u′) (which is why v1 prefers to connect to u among all other vertices in S
5). In particular, this is true for any vertex z at maximum distance from u in G[S]. Having vertices v, u, w
and z in mind, we now distinguish two cases:
5 In particular, the inequality WG[S](u) ≤ WG[S](u
′) is a direct consequence of the SSE conditions and the fact
that {u, v1} is a bridge. Indeed, for any vertex u
′ in S, let G′ be the graph produced by swapping {v1, u} with
{v1, u
′}. Then, by the SSE conditions WG(v1) ≤ WG′(v1). Also, since {v1, u} (respectively {v1, u
′}) is a bridge in
G (respectively G′), we have that
WG(v1) =WG[S](v1) +WG[V−S](v1) =WG[S](u) + |S|+WG[V−S](v1).
An identical expression holds for WG′(v1), and since WG′[V−S](v1) = WG[V−S](v1), we can conclude that
WG[S](u) ≤WG[S](u
′).
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1. If |S| ≤ n2 , then z would prefer swapping any of its edges leading to u in order to connect directly to v1
(see also Figure 1 for reference). Indeed, if G′ is the graph after the swap, then the new cost of z will be
WG′(z) = −dist(u, z)|V − S|+
∑
x∈V−S
distG(x, z) + |S| − 1 +
∑
x∈S−{z}
distG(x, u) (1)
≤ 2|S| − n+ 1 +
∑
x∈V−S
distG(x, z) +WG[S](u)
≤ 2|S| − n+ 1 +
∑
x∈V−S
distG(x, z) +WG[S](z)
< WG(z) (2)
where in inequality (2) we used the fact that WG[S](u) ≤ WG[S](u′) for any vertex u′ ∈ S. But then we
proved that z has a profitable swap, which is a contradiction because G is by assumption in SSE.
u v1 vk−1 v
w
z
S
Fig. 1. An illustration of vertices u, v, w, z, the set S and the swap of vertex z to v1.
v
u w
x
(a)
v
u w
w
′N(w′) ∋ z
(b)
Fig. 2. (a) Non-existence of an induced cycle of size strictly greater than 5 including vertices u, v and w. (b) Illustration
of a profitable swap for w for the case where (u,w) does not exist and diam(G) ≥ 10.
2. The case |S| ≥ n2 is similar by symmetry: v1 will have the role of u, w will have the role of z (i.e. the
vertex at maximum distance from v1 in V −S, and z will have the role of w (i.e. a neighbor of u different
from v1). Notice then that since |V −S| ≤ n2 , we can use an identical reasoning with that of the previous
case in order to prove that w has a profitable swap (i.e. deleting any of its edges leading to v1 to connect
to u), which is a contradiction because G is by assumption in SSE.
This shows that there are at least two paths from u to v that the first edge on each path is different. The
corresponding proof for v − u paths is similar and so the proof of part (A.) of the lemma is complete.
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Part (B.): Let v be a vertex of degree 2 and let u,w be its two neighbors. Assume for the sake of
contradiction that diam(G) ≥ 10. Then there is a vertex w′ such that dist(w,w′) ≥ 5. We now distinguish
two cases:
(a) If the edge (u,w) exists, then it is profitable for w to swap (w, v) with (w,w′). Indeed, this swap increases
the distance of w from v by 1, decreases its distance from w′ by at least 4 and it does not increase its
distance from any other vertex.
(b) If edge (u,w) does not exist, then any vertex in NG(u) ∪ NG(w) must belong to a cycle of length at
most 5 which includes v, u and w (if there was a vertex x which does not belong to such a small cycle
and assuming, without loss of generality, that x ∈ NG(u), then we come to a contradiction, because it
is profitable for w to swap (w, v) with (w, u) – for reference, see Figure 2(a); this swap increases the
distance of w from v by 1, decreases its distance from u by 1, decreases its distance from x by 1 and it
does not increase its distance from any other vertex). But then swapping (w, v) with (w,w′) is profitable
for w. Indeed, this swap increases the distance of w from v by at most 3, increases its distance from u
by at most 1, decreases its distance from w′ by at least 4, decreases the distance from any neighbor of
w′ by at least 2 and it does not increase its distance from any other vertex (see Figure 2(b)).
So in both cases we have a contradiction to the fact that G is in SSE, which completes the proof of part (B.)
of the lemma. ⊓⊔
2.2 A Structural Characterization of Graphs in SSE
We first give some definitions that will be useful in the statement of Theorem 1. For a positive integer c and
vertices u, v ∈ V , let Au,v(c) be the set of vertices whose distances from u and v differ by exactly c, i.e.,
setting k1 = min{distG(u, z), distG(v, z)} and k2 = max{distG(u, z), distG(v, z)}, we have
Au,v(c)
def
= {z ∈ V \{u, v} : k2 − k1 = c}. (3)
The following Theorem is a strong structural characterization of graphs in SSE.
Theorem 1. Let G = (V,E) be a graph in SSE. Then
∑∞
c=0 c|Au,v(c)| ≤ δ
′
uv+1
δ′uv−1n, for any two vertices
u, v ∈ V , where δ′uv
def
= min{deg−1(v), deg−1(u)}.
Proof. Let u, v ∈ V be any two vertices at distance at least 2, such that
2 ≤ δ′uv
def
= min{deg−1(v), deg−1(u)}. (4)
We now perform the following random experiment: With probability 12 pick vertex u and then swap a
randomly (and uniformly) chosen edge connecting u with one of its neighbors in N−1(u) with the (previously
non-existing) edge {u, v}. Otherwise, pick vertex v and swap a randomly chosen edge in N−1(v) with the
(previously non-existing) edge {v, u}. We will denote by G′ the resulting graph after the swap. Notice that
G remains connected after any such swap.
Consider a vertex z ∈ V \{u, v} and define integers k1 = min{distG(u, z), distG(v, z)} and also k2 =
max{distG(u, z), distG(v, z)}. Let also Xz denote the random variable of the distance increase between z
and the vertex that performed the swap in the above random experiment. Notice that Xz < 0 if the farthest
vertex from z was chosen and k2 > k1 + 1 (see, for example, Figure 3). Furthermore, Xz ≥ 0 if the closest
vertex from z was chosen along with an incident edge that happens to be in all shortest paths from the
chosen vertex to z. Since, there is at most one choice for incident edges in which the latest scenario happens,
we conclude that Xz is stochastically dominated by the following random variable:
Yz =


k1 + 1− k2, with probability 12
k2 + 1− k1, with probability 12 1δ′uv
0, otherwise.
(5)
6
u v
z
k1
k2
Fig. 3. A profitable swap happens with probability at least 1/2.
By domination we then have that
E[Xz] ≤ E[Yz ] = 1
2δ′uv
((δ′uv − 1)(k1 − k2) + δ′uv + 1) . (6)
Therefore, E[Xz ] is small when k1 is much smaller than k2 and is always at most
3
4 .
Define now X to be the total increase in the sum of distances of the swapping vertex from every other
vertex in V \{u, v}. By linearity of expectation, equation (6) and the definition of Au,v(c) we have
E[X ] =
∑
z∈V \{u,v}
E[Xz ]
≤
∞∑
c=0
∑
z∈Au,v(c)
1
2δ′uv
(δ′uv + 1− (δ′uv − 1)c) (7)
=
∞∑
c=0
δ′uv − 1
2δ′uv
(
δ′uv + 1
δ′uv − 1
− c
)
|Au,v(c)|. (8)
The right hand side of the above inequality becomes negative when
∑∞
c=0 c|Au,v(c)| > δ
′
uv+1
δ′uv−1n. By the
probabilistic method E[X ] < 0 would imply that there is a swap between u and v that improves the cost of
the swapping vertex. But this is a contradiction, since G is in SSE. This completes the proof of the Theorem.
⊓⊔
We now give an alternative, useful interpretation of Theorem 1. For any two vertices u, v and a randomly
chosen vertex Z ∈ V −{u, v}, let Du,v(Z) = |dist(u, Z)−dist(v, Z)|. Namely, Du,v(Z) is the random variable
of the absolute difference of the distance of Z from u, v. We then have the following:
Corollary 1. Let G = (V,E) be a graph in SSE. Then, for any two vertices u, v of degree greater than 1,
we have that E[Du,v(Z)] ≤ 3.
Notice that the constant 3 in the above Theorem can be made smaller if we have additional information of
the degrees of each vertex. For example, provided G is in SSE and has no vertex of degree 1, then by the
second part of Lemma 1 we have the following: Either diam(G) ≤ 9, or E[Du,v(Z)] ≤ 43 , for any two vertices
u, v ∈ V .
2.3 Large k-Vicinity and Dense Graphs
Using the structural characterization of Theorem 1 we can prove bounds on the diameter of SSE graphs that
are either dense or have large maximum degree. The following result relates the size of the largest k-vicinity
of a graph G in SSE to its diameter diam(G).
Theorem 2. Let G = (V,E) be a graph in SSE and let ∆(k) = maxu |Bu(k)|. Then diam(G) ≤ 6n∆(k) +2+4k,
for any k > 0.
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Proof. Let u ∈ V be such that |Bu(k)| = ∆(k) and let u′ be a vertex with deg(u′) ≥ 2 which is at maximum
distance from u. Then dist(u, u′) ≥ diam(G)2 − 1. Furthermore, by the triangle inequality, for any w ∈ Bu(k)
we have that
dist(w, u′) ≥ dist(u, u′)− dist(u,w) ≥ diam(G)
2
− 1− k. (9)
Therefore, there are at least ∆(k) vertices w for which Du,u′(w) = |dist(w, u′)−dist(w, u)| ≥ diam(G)2 −1−2k.
Choosing now a vertex Z uniformly at random we have
E[Du,u′(Z)] ≥
1
n

 ∑
z∈N(u)
Du,u′(Z) +
∑
z/∈N(u)
Du,u′(Z)

 (10)
≥
∆(k)
n
(
diam(G)
2
− 1− 2k
)
. (11)
Applying Theorem 1 we must have that ∆
(k)
n
(
diam(G)
2 − 1− 2k
)
≤ 3, which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Notice that, by Theorem 2, if (say) for k = diam(G)5 we have ∆
(k) = n
poly(log n) , then the diameter of
the SSE graph is polylogarithmic. Furthermore, since for k = 1 we have that |Bu(1)| = deg(u) + 1, we can
conclude the following easy Corollary concerning the diameter of large degree graphs in SSE:
Corollary 2. Let G = (V,E) be a graph in SSE and let its maximum degree be such that ∆ ≥ n
logl n
, for
some l > 0. Then diam(G) = O(logl n).
We also note that the upper bounds on the diameter of a graph in SSE that we can prove using directly
either Lemma 10 or Corollary 11 of [2] are weaker than the ones we proved here using Theorem 1 by a factor
of Θ(log n).
We can also prove the following result relating the diameter of a graph G in SSE to the number of its
edges.
Theorem 3. Let G = (V,E) be a graph of minimum degree at least 2 and let e(G) be the number of its
edges. If G is in SSE, then diam(G) ≤ 6n2
e(G)+n2
+ 4. In particular, if e(G) ≥ n2
logl n
, for some l > 0, then
diam(G) ≤ O(logl n).
Proof. Set k0 =
diam(G)
8 . By Theorem 2, for any u ∈ V we have that
Bu(k0) ≤ 12n
diam(G)− 4 . (12)
This implies that there are at least 12n
(
n− 12n
diam(G)−4
)
pairs of vertices u, v which have dist(u, v) ≥ k0 +1.
The number of such pairs of vertices must be at most the number of non-edges in G. Therefore,
(
n
2
)
− e(G) ≥ 1
2
n
(
n− 12n
diam(G)− 4
)
(13)
from which we get the desired bound. ⊓⊔
3 A Model of Local Costs
We now define our Local Cost Network Creation Game, which is simpler than the model of [2] and also
admits an exact potential. Let G = (V,E) be any undirected graph with n nodes. As in the model of [2], the
players in our game can be identified as the set of vertices of the graph, and any player u ∈ V can swap one
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of its incident edges (which defines the set of available actions for each player). In contrast to [2] however,
the payoff of a vertex depends only on the structure of its immediate neighborhood and not on the entire
network. In particular, we define the profit of u ∈ V in G as γG(u) =
∑
v∈NG(u) degG(v), i.e., the profit of u
is the sum of the degrees of its neighbors6. A profitable swap is an edge swap that improves (increases) the
profit of the vertex that performs it.
Notice that an arbitrary sequence of profitable swaps (by nodes v1, v2, . . .) actually transforms the initial
graph through a sequence of configuration graphs G0, G1, G2, . . .. We will write Gi
vi→ Gi+1 and mean that
configuration Gi produces configuration Gi+1 by a selfish swap by vertex vi. Vertex vi is called deviator in
configuration Gi. A graph G is a local cost swap equilibrium configuration if no vertex can perform a selfish
(improving) swap. We note the following:
Theorem 4. If G is a local cost swap equilibrium configuration, then it contains a star as a spanning
subgraph.
Proof. Notice that a vertex u does not have a profitable swap in G when degG(v) > degG(w), for any
v ∈ NG(u) and w /∈ NG(u). This means that u connects to all vertices of maximum degree. Moreover, either
all vertices are connected to all vertices of maximum degree and the graph contains a star as a spanning
subgraph, or there is some vertex u not connected to at least one vertex w of maximum degree, in which case
u can benefit from swapping one of its edges to connect to w and thus increase the maximum degree. ⊓⊔
3.1 An Exact Potential
We now show that our Local Cost Network Creation Game admits an exact potential function.
Theorem 5. The function Φ(G) = 12
∑
v∈V (G) degG(v)
2 is an exact potential for the Local Cost Network
Creation Game.
Proof. Consider a profitable swap performed by vertex u, which swaps edge {u, v} ∈ E(G) with edge {u,w} /∈
E(G) and let G′ be the resulting graph. Then the following are true: (a) degG′(u) = degG(u), (b) degG′(v) =
degG(v)−1, (c) degG′(w) = degG(w)+1 and (d) the degree of any other vertex remains unchanged. Therefore
γG′(u)− γG(u) =
∑
z∈NG′(u)
degG′(z)−
∑
z∈NG(u)
degG(z) (14)
= degG(w) + 1− degG(v). (15)
The corresponding change in the value of the function Φ(·) is then
Φ(G′)− Φ(G) = 1
2
(
degG′(v)
2 + degG′(w)
2
)− 1
2
(
degG(v)
2 − degG(w)2
)
(16)
= degG(w) − degG(v) + 1 (17)
= γG′(u)− γG(u) (18)
which proves that Φ(·) is an exact potential for our game. ⊓⊔
3.2 Reaching Equilibrium using a Limited Number of Queries
By Theorem 5, an equilibrium graph can be found in at most O(n3) time steps (egde swaps), starting from
any initial graph. However, in order for a vertex u to compute a better response (i.e., a profitable swap), it
requires information about the degree from all non-adjacent vertices in the graph, i.e., all v ∈ V \ NG(u).
6 A natural generalization is to consider nodes at distance at most k from u.
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In many cases though, especially for large-scale networks like the Internet, it is inefficient to acquire such
information about all the nodes in the network. On the other hand, we can assume that any vertex u can
get such information for a limited (e.g., constant) number of non-neighboring nodes by asking an oracle (this
setup is also common in the literature of property testing in graphs, see for example [7]). In this setup the
following holds:
Theorem 6. If any vertex u can obtain information about the degree of c ≥ 1 randomly chosen non-
neighboring vertices, then our network formation game can converge in an equilibrium graph in a polynomial
expected number of steps.
Proof. Let G0 = (V0, E0) be the current graph. Consider the following procedure: At any time t ≥ 1, select
a vertex u uniformly at random from V and then ask the oracle to reveal the degrees of c randomly chosen
non-neighbors of u (we assume that u knows the degrees of its neighbors), namely v1, . . . vc ∈ Vt−NGt(u). If
one of the vertices among v1, . . . , vc has degree equal or larger than the degree of some neighboring vertex of
u in Gt, then u performs a profitable swap. Otherwise, it does nothing. The resulting graph will be denoted
by Gt = (Vt, Et).
Notice now that, if at any time step t, Gt is not an equilibrium graph, then by Theorem 5 there must
be at least one profitable swap. In particular, there exist vertices u, v, w such that w ∈ NGt(u), v /∈ NGt(u)
and degGt(w) ≤ degGt(v). The probability that u is selected and also v is among the randomly chosen
non-neighbors of u is at least c
n2
.
Consider now the stochastic process {Xt}t≥0, where Xt = 12
∑
z∈Vt degGt(z)
2. Notice then that, provided
Gt is not an equilibrium graph, Pr(Xt+1 ≥ Xt + 1) ≥ cn2 and also Pr(Xt+1 = Xt) = 1−Pr(Xt+1 ≥ Xt + 1).
Notice also that the absorbing states of the stochastic process {Xt}t≥0 correspond to equilibrium graphs,
and we have 0 ≤ Xt ≤ n32 for any t and in particular, for any equilibrium graph Gt.
From the above, we conclude that the number of steps needed for {Xt}t≥0 to reach an absorbing state
is stochastically dominated by a geometrically distributed random variable Geom
(
n3
2 ,
c
n2
)
. Therefore, the
mean number of steps needed for absorption is at most n
5
2c , which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
We note also that we can decide whether the procedure in the proof of Theorem 6 has reached an
equilibrium graph with high probability. Indeed, if after at least Ω(n3) steps no swap has occurred, then
by the Markov inequality, we can correctly (positively) decide whether we have reached equilibrium with
probability at least 1−O ( 1
n
)
.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we considered network formation games based on the swap operation. In particular, for the
sum version of the model of Alon et al. [2] we provided a new, structural characterization of equilibrium
graphs (Theorem 1), according to which, for any two vertices of degree greater than 1, the majority of the
rest of the vertices are almost equidistant from them. By a direct application of Theorem 1 we could prove
poly-logarithmic upper bounds on the diameter of SSE graphs that are either dense enough or have large
k-vicinity (thus partially settling positively a conjecture of [2] for these cases). It remains open whether we
can use the full power of Theorem 1 to provide more general and stronger bounds on the diameter of graphs
in SSE.
As a second contribution, we defined in this paper a new network formation game, which is also based
on the swap operation, but the cost for each player/vertex depends only on the degrees of its neighbors.
We proved that this network creation game admits an exact potential, and also that any equilibrium graph
contains an induced star. Furthermore, we considered a case where vertices can only acquire limited knowledge
concerning non-neighboring vertices and we showed that, even in this case, we can reach equilibrium in
expected polynomial time. Providing bounds for the price of anarchy in this model is left as an open problem
for future research. Finally, we intend to study extensions of our model of local costs, in which the profit for
each vertex depends on the structure of its k-vicinity.
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